| here's chapter from 1984's report on why sustainability 2025 depends
on sea-change in education and true media | oil and carbon energy the future of peoples in 190+ nations versus
saudi, usa, russia and arctic cirle- this circular coastal belt are where energies new and old fuse globally- and likely will
determine climate sustaiability | health when one country usa spends 20% on health services and does
a scarily worse job fot the ordinary person than eg korea that spends hals as much - why dont epensive nations benchmark quality
ones | massive media new and old- money spent on media is hundred times more than 1945- when does beingentertained reach
an unbearble cost for youth | arms trade - we wish this was down instead of up | obese food and drink | | |
| | | | | | | | |
260
years ago adam smith and james watt glasgow university started mapping age of machines and mans from uk to west- how to winwin
with east cast usa then usa south, then usa north, then west the acrooss to japan and islands if far east the asian mainland
today
in 2020 can we agree on how peopes of 200 nations have needs that are prirtitised by geograhpy as well as worldwide challenges
such as virus
one group of nations is largest in number, smallest in population and land resources
ie the 50 small island developing nations
another group is all nations sharng the arctic circle
- if world is going to trabsition safely (withut ocean meltdown its these natins who influenceboth arbon and green markets
- how do they unite this sectirs sdg transformation
another group is17 plus 1- one of the first groups to have an
online mapping debate in the virus online world- hee is part of summary thanks to
wilson centerEmpty shell no more:
China’s growing footprint in
Central and Eastern Europe
POLICY
PAPER
IVANA KARÁSKOVÁ, ALICJA BACHULSKA,
ÁGNES SZUNOMÁR, STEFAN VLADISAVLJEV,
UNA
ALEKSANDRA BĒRZIŅA-ČERENKOVA,
KONSTANTINAS ANDRIJAUSKAS, LIISI KARINDI,
ANDREEA LEONTE,
NINA PEJIĆ, FILIP ŠEBOK
Empty shell no more:
China’s growing footprint
in
Central and Eastern Europe
POLICY PAPER
IVANA KARÁSKOVÁ, ALICJA BACHULSKA,
ÁGNES SZUNOMÁR, STEFAN VLADISAVLJEV,
UNA ALEKSANDRA BĒRZIŅA-ČERENKOVA, KONSTANTINAS
ANDRIJAUSKAS, LIISI KARINDI,
ANDREEA LEONTE, NINA PEJIĆ, FILIP ŠEBOK
EMPTY SHELL NO MORE:
CHINA’S GROWING FOOTPRINT
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Policy paper
April 2020
Editor
– Ivana Karásková
Authors – Konstantinas Andrijauskas, Alicja Bachulska, Una Aleksandra
Bērziņa-Čerenkova,
Ivana Karásková, Liisi Karindi, Andreea Leonte, Nina Pejić,
Ágnes Szunomár, Filip Šebok,
Stefan Vladisavljev
Citation – Karásková,
I., Bachulska, A., Szunomár, A., Vladisavljev, S. (eds.) (2020).
Empty shell no more: China’s growing
footprint in Central and Eastern Europe.
Prague, Czech Republic, Association for International Affairs (AMO).
Handbook
for stakeholders – To access the handbook for stakeholders stemming from this report,
please refer to the
electronic version which can be found online at www.chinaobservers.eu.
The publication was prepared within the China
Observers in Central and Eastern Europe
(CHOICE) collaborative platform. CHOICE monitors and evaluates the rising
influence of the
People’s Republic of China in countries of Central and Eastern Europe which participate in
the
China-proposed 17+1 initiative. CHOICE strives to build a multinational platform for open
discussion, experience-sharing
and critical assessment. CHOICE is run by the Association for
International Affairs (AMO), a Prague-based foreign
policy think tank and NGO. The preparation
of this paper was supported by a grant from National Endowment for Democracy
(NED).
Typesetting – Zdeňka Plocrová
Print – Vydavatelství KUFR, s.r.o.
– tiskárna
ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (AMO)
Žitná 27/608
CZ
110 00 Praha 1
Tel.: +420 224 813 460
info@amo.cz
www.amo.cz
© AMO 2020
ISBN
978-80-87092-72-9 (print version)
ISBN 978-80-87092-71-2 (pdf version)
Table of Contents
Summary
7
Recommendations 9
Engaging China in 17+1: Outline of ACT strategy 11
1. Political relations:
Beyond proclamations 14
Bilateral relations: Different trajectories 18
Let’s party, comrades: Local
political parties’ relations with CCP 23
Sub-national, underestimated? A booming component of 17+1 cooperation
26
Cutting-edge, or driving a wedge: Is 17+1 dividing Europe? 30
China in CEE politics: Conclusion and
recommendations 32
2. Economic relations: A sugar cane, or a sugar-coated stick? 35
Not so special: Modest
impact of 17+1 on trade relations 35
We are the champions: V4 countries and China’s foreign direct investments
42
All roads lead to China: Cooperation in infrastructure and connectivity 47
Follow the money: Financial
cooperation in V4 51
The irresistible draw: China-CEE tourism as a success story 53
The economy of pros
and cons: Conclusion and recommendations 55
3. We the people? The challenges of societal relations with China 57
Don’t
trust anyone under thirty: Youth cooperation and its perils 64
Collective sports? Support for China before the 2022
Olympics 66
Natural remedy? The curious case of traditional Chinese medicine
as an export commodity 68
The
fourth estate and a new global power: Telling the China story 69
People-to-People’s Republic relations: Conclusion
and recommendations 71
Authors 73
About CHOICE 75
About AMO 77
Footnotes 79
Empty shell no more: China’s growing footprint in Central and Eastern Europe
7
Summary
→
The 17+1 platform has been
labeled as an ‘empty shell’ with
the assertion that cooperation
between
Central and Eastern
Europe with China lacks
substance. A large-scale audit
of relations, however,
points
to a more complex scenario.
Relations between China and
Central and Eastern Europe are
growing,
encompassing political,
economic and societal domains
and are loaded with action.
→ The
fragmented nature of
the information complicates
understanding of the real nature
of 17+1, as
in individual states
China’s actions seem scarce
and random. Also the areas
of interaction
are treated as
separate. It is only when the
whole picture is analyzed that
the progress and
direction of the
17+1 platform become evident.
→ In the past eight years, China
has managed
to build a system
of interconnected relations in
Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE), where it
was almost
absent before. Paradoxically,
China has contributed to
the conceptualization and
institutionalization
of CEE as
a region.
→ Resembling a version of
US alliances in East Asia,
the
17+1 framework can be
characterized by a hub and
spokes logic of cooperation
with China taking
the lead in
‘multilateral bilateralism’.
→ Despite its efforts, China has not
transplanted
its foreign policy
concepts into the language
of cooperation with Central
and Eastern Europe.
On the
contrary, the CEE countries
have successfully shaped the
diplomatic language to stay
in
accordance with the EU
framework. 17+1 cooperation
has almost universally led to
the growth
of high-level political
contacts between the CEE
countries and China. However,
the development
of bilateral
relationships happens on separate
trajectories. It is the activity and
decisions
taken by the individual
17 CEE countries rather than the
format itself which shape the level
of
engagement.
→ While Hungary and Serbia have
supported China on political
issues, they represent
an
exception rather than the rule. The
assumptions that CEE as a whole
has become more forthcoming
towards
China on political issues
is not supported by the evidence.
→ China has used the CEE as
a
testing ground for more activist
party diplomacy led by the
Chinese Communist Party.
Empty shell
no more: China’s growing footprint in Central and Eastern Europe 8
China cultivates relationships with
important
political elites to assure
a long-term pro-China inclination
in the respective countries.
→
China has unsuccessfully tried
to assuage the EU’s concerns
about using the format to divide
Europe.
The US-China rivalry has
become a factor in CEE relations
with China, with several countries
afraid
of endangering their
traditional ties with Washington.
China has tried to walk a fine line
in
its approach towards Russia in
CEE.
→ Economic cooperation in 17+1 is
mainly driven by
China as it sets
the agenda.
→ China’s economic impact on
CEE countries is still
small. CEE
countries are highly dependent
on both trade and investment
relations with developed,
mainly
EU member states, while China
represents a minor yet increasing
share. The CEE region
is also
far from being among the most
important partners for China.
→ Despite the 17+1
format, China
still handles its economic affairs
on a bilateral basis. Relations
with the countries
of the Visegrád
region and Serbia are of particular
importance, while relations with
other
CEE countries lag behind.
→ Trade relations remain relatively
limited and unbalanced, leading
to
an increased trade deficit in all
17 CEE countries with China.
→ Chinese FDI are modest and
concentrated
in a few countries
(Hungary, Czechia and Poland)
with almost no opportunity for
other countries
to receive sizable
amounts of investment. Although
financial cooperation has gained
momentum,
it is limited to EU
member states.
→ Tourism is the real success story of
economic cooperation
within the
framework, since CEE countries
have achieved higher visibility in
China (while a
general increase
in the amount of Chinese middle
class travelers may also play
a role).
→
Given the character of the
Chinese system and the high level
of penetration of Chinese society
by
the state, people-to-people
contacts actually mean Chinese
government-to-people in relations
with
CEE countries.
→ The number of Confucius Institutes
has increased in CEE countries.
Youth
cooperation is also on the
rise, with increased numbers of
Chinese government scholarships
issued
to CEE students.
→ Politically motivated programs
targeting youth and political
leaders,
such as Bridge for the
Future, China-CEE Young Political
Leaders Forum and Political
Parties
Dialogue, go largely
unnoticed in all 17 CEE countries.
Empty shell no more: China’s growing footprint
in Central and Eastern Europe
9
Recommendations
→ The 17+1 format should not be
discarded.
The simplistic view of
Europe being divided by China
through 17+1 should be opposed as
it infantilizes
the CEE states and
denies CEE countries their agency.
17 CEE countries should adopt
the ACT
strategy proposed in this
paper in their dealings with China.
→ The EU needs to continue
including
CEE EU members in
efforts to shape a common EU
policy towards China that should
represent the
interests of all
member states.
→ The EU should open a clear path to
membership to the
Western Balkan
countries to offset the growth of
China’s political influence. The
EU must
play a more active role
in the Western Balkan’s economic
development.
→ The 17 countries
should improve
their communication and
coordination in feasible areas to
shift the 17+1 into
a multilateral
forum serving primarily their
interests.
→ More attention should be given
to
the sub-national (regional,
provincial, etc.) dimension of
China-CEE cooperation that has
largely
developed under the radar.
CEE states should pay attention to
the potential politicization of such
cooperation
and China’s efforts
to take advantage of the lower
profile of local contacts to avoid
attention.
→
The increased prominence of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
in China’s approach towards the
CEE
warrants vigilance. There
should be greater scrutiny by the
civil society and media towards
nontransparent
dealings between
the local parties and the CCP.
→ In order to benefit more from
economic
cooperation with China,
CEE countries should act together.
Regular 17+0 consultation meetings
should
precede summits.
→ The major challenges of trade
relations, such as trade deficit,
cannot
be overcome by single
country solutions; CEE countries
should follow the EU’s strategic
aims
in trade policy.
→ Coordinated rules should be
established relating to investment
screening
also in non-EU member
states.
→ Independent, fact-based media
coverage is needed in order
to
achieve greater transparency and
understanding of mechanisms
behind societal cooperation
between
China and CEE countries.
→ More public (on EU, state, or
regional levels) as well as private
Empty
shell no more: China’s growing footprint in Central and Eastern Europe 10
financial support for academic
institutions
researching China
is needed in order to avoid
a situation where Confucius
Institutes and other
PRC-related
institutions become the most
influential actors producing and
disseminating knowledge
about
Chinese politics, society and
culture.
→ China watchers should exchange
knowledge
and experiences across
Europe and with other parts of the
world in order to detect potential
threats
to democratic standards
governing the societal level of
cooperation with Chinese actors
outside
of the PRC.
→ It remains crucial not to equate
all forms of societal cooperation
with China
with potential threats.
The focus should be on achieving
transparency.
→ CEE countries
should be aware of
the risks associated with a growing
skepticism towards China turning
into
racist attitudes against the
Chinese diaspora, students and
tourists. In order to avoid the
rise
of Sinophobia in CEE, clear
divisions should be drawn between
public criticism of government or
party-led
activities and Chinese
nationals and their presence in the
region.
Empty shell no more: China’s
growing footprint in Central and Eastern Europe
11
Engaging China in 17+1:
Outline of ACT strategy
Ivana
Karásková
The 17+1 platform1 has been labeled by some as China’s tool to divide and conquer
Europe.2
At the same time, analysts (the author included) frequently dismissed these
charges, arguing that 17+1 is an ‘empty
shell’ and cooperation between Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) and China lacks substance.3 The divide in
understanding of
the platform became apparent when China announced the upgrading of the annual
17+1 summit
which was expected to be held in Beijing in April 2020 from the level
of prime ministers to the level of heads of
state. The first camp of analysts perceived
it as a worrisome trend, while the latter argued that it is mostly the
prime ministers,
not the presidents, who call the shots in Central and Eastern European politics. Thus
the
upgrade, they argued, was only symbolic.4
The proponents of the ‘empty shell’ concept, however, seem
to be wrong. A largescale
audit of relations between China and the 17 Central and Eastern European
countries
points to a more alarming scenario. Substance in relations with China is,
indeed, not lacking, and cooperation between
China and Central and Eastern Europe
flourishes, encompassing political, economic and societal dimensions, and is
loaded
with action.
The reason why observers missed these developments is two-fold. First, the information
is
fragmented. In individual Central and Eastern European states, China’s actions
look scarce and random. 17+1
is neither a multilateral forum, nor a bilateral one.
It is an exercise of ‘multilateral bilateralism’5,
resembling the hub and spoke system
of relations, with China acting as a hub in the middle. The spokes, i.e. the
Central and
Eastern European countries, exhibit – to their detriment – limited if any cooperation
among
themselves. Second, the areas of interaction, be they political, economic or
societal, have been treated as separate.
However, 17+1 is not only a political platform,
it breaches politics and enters into domains of economy, youth cooperation,
academic
exchanges, sport, health or media cooperation. Only when the whole picture is analyzed,
does
the progress and direction of the 17+1 platform become evident.
Over the past eight years, since the inception of
17+1 in 2012, China has managed
to build a system of interconnected relations in CEE, a region where it had
been
almost absent before. For the foreseeable future, China will continue to rise in
power and importance. Its increasing
global presence, already taken for granted, will
inevitably stimulate its willingness to seek influence through
different organizational
and institutional settings, including (sub)regional organizations. Given the fact that
China
finds it extremely difficult to ‘infiltrate’ the long-existing ones, it will attempt
to multiply the
groupings of its own founding, and will try to extract as much as
possible from those already in existence, such
as 17+1.
Empty shell no more: China’s growing footprint in Central and Eastern Europe 12
The fears
of Chinese incursions on many levels (technological, economic, political,
or even military) are, factoring in specific
regional contexts, substantiated and
the dangers are real. However, a response to the threat of expanding Chinese
influence
in the form of shutting Beijing out is, in practical terms, impossible – not least
because
it would probably provoke more extreme reactions from the PRC. Instead,
a three-pronged ACT (adapt > counter
> target) strategy, modeled on the realities of
the 17+1 initiative, is suggested.
While seemingly
obvious, adapting to China’s presence in the region (be it in Central
and Eastern Europe, or elsewhere) may
in fact be the hardest component and the
most difficult to pull off correctly. China as an actor and an issue will
continue to be
a stable and growing, if often irritating, component of various regional constellations.
Accepting
this fact should not be confused with resignation and much less submission
to China’s strategic interests.
Quite the contrary: national and international strategies
need to assess the existing and potential scope of China’s
presence, define priorities
as well as risks stemming from this phenomenon, and implement or address them
through
subsequent policies.
Groupings like 17+1 were clearly born out of China’s intention to create institutional
tools
for amplifying its message and increasing its influence. Still, their members
can conceivably utilize them as platforms
for countering, limiting or even curbing
China’s heft. The way forward consists in making full use of these
organizations’ multilateral
settings. While countries like Czechia, Estonia or Greece may find it difficult
to
face Chinese actions alone, there is no formal impediment against them bonding
together and presenting their Chinese
partners with a unified position. If China wants
to retain its presence through these institutions, it is more likely
(if grudgingly) to
accept the ‘multilateral condition’ than to risk losing its influence altogether.
Once
the members of regional platforms like 17+1 rediscover the multiplication
effects inherent in ‘effective multilateralism’,
to borrow a phrase from the 2003 European
Security Strategy, they could even turn these platforms into offensive
instruments
for targeting China with their specific demands. These might include
widely controversial topics (from the Chinese
perspective), such as limits imposed
on Chinese technological companies or concerns with unfair trade practices,
but also
more cooperative issues like the need for properly regulating Chinese investment
and improving
market access for CEE countries’ products. While the actions of EU
member states need to be in line with the
agreed position on China within the EU,
the CEE EU member states can utilize the 17+1 to achieve a better standing
in negotiations
not only vis-à-vis China, but also within the EU. The Western Balkans naturally
pivot
towards the European Union, despite the unfortunate lack of a credible
and clear enlargement roadmap at the time
of writing the publication. The EU should
then open a clear path to membership to the Western Balkan countries to
offset the
growth of China’s political influence.
The current debate seems transfixed by the image
of China as an omnipotent,
ever-
present and inescapable threat. China is – and will remain –
far from it. Even small
states, especially those safely separated from the immediate effects of China’s economic,
political
and military might, can succeed in promoting their own interests to their
dealings with the PRC. The ACT strategy
provides a general outline for achieving
this objective.
Empty shell no more: China’s growing footprint
in Central and Eastern Europe
13
The following chapters analyze relations between China and 17 Central
and
Eastern European countries (CEECs) in three separate areas – political, economic
and societal,
documenting China’s increasing footprint in the region. The publication
represents the first attempt to systematically
audit China-CEE relations. Given the
scope of the endeavor and a lack of information in several areas or specific
countries,
the publication does not claim to tackle each and every form of cooperation. Still, it
attempts
to uncover and analyze patterns pertaining to the region as a whole.
Ten China experts from Czechia, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania provided their input via a novel and unique
collaborative
platform, China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE),
in order to reach realistic and achievable suggestions
for a joint action plan of CEE
countries within the outlined ACT strategy.
